China's treaty revision campaigns in the 1920s: a case study of frame-genealogy approach in IR

China’s treaty revision movement in the 1920s: a case study of the revisionist-integrationist duality in foreign policy

This chapter examines the treaty revision campaign, a crucial element of China’s foreign policy in the 1920s, in order to answer one set of understudied questions of international relations: Can there be a situation wherein a state acts both as a system challenger (that endeavors to change certain elements of international order) and a system supporter (that upholds the existing international order by participating in it)? If so, what factors, material or ideational, drive the state to behave that way? Which level of analysis, systemic or unit-level, should be given more weight in accounting for the state’s seemingly paradoxical foreign policy? A complementary question would be: how to explain a phenomenon in which the demands of a state in international politics are not commensurate with her relative capabilities?
Structural realism of international relations (IR) scholarship has suggested that the structure of international relations—the anarchical character of international politics and the relative distribution of state capabilities—more adequately explains and predicts the long-term development of international relations. I argue, however, that anarchy and material capabilities are necessary, but not sufficient variables, that shape the process and determine the outcome of interactions among states. I consider anarchy and material capabilities as structural parameters that externally constrain the scope of a state’s foreign policy goals and means, but they rarely directly dictate the state’s foreign policy or bear on her domestic governance. The structural realist presupposition of a “transmission belt” that automatically translates systemic pressures into the foreign policy calculation of the state’s political leadership at the unit-level does not hold in empirical studies.[i]
This project hence rests on a presupposition that is distinctive to structural realism: in addition to relative material capabilities that significantly shape power relations of states in anarchical international politics, the ways by which states perceive and interpret such “objectively” defined power relations should be an equally important focus of foreign policy analysis. Foreign policymaking, as neo-classical realism suggests, is never a mechanical reflection of the external environment; rather, it is much more a product of a dynamic process whose participants contend for the dominant interpretation of the external opportunities and challenges.[ii] The material structure of international relations is restrictive, if not decisive, of the state’s foreign policymaking and domestic institution-building—the two political phenomena whose investigation requires the inclusion of normative-ideational factors in the explanatory equation. Instead of conceptualizing international power relations as an independent variable that causes certain policy/behavior to happen as dependent variables, I consider it more appropriate to characterize international relations as a dynamic temporal-spatial context of power relations that both constrains and makes available certain foreign policy options to the foreign policy-makers of each state. A context of international power relations, as Helle Malmvig maintains, is a condition of possibility that allows multiple configurations of discourse and practice to be generated by actors, hence leading to different endpoints in history.[iii]
By suggests that history “could have been different,” this conception of historiography enables a research strategy that avoids determinism and teleology, and preserves agency and contingency, even in a historical case.[iv] Instead of emphasizing the end result of a linear and mechanic relationship between a cause and its effect, my research argues that history is not an irreversible series of events inevitably resulted in a particular outcome. Moreover, I attempt to highlight the historical process in which interactive actors or groups of actors, through their purpose-driven discourses and activities, mobilized the context-given resources (both material and ideational) to enlarge their power base and further their own political agenda that eventually led to a re-configuration of formality and content of international relations in a specified issue-area.
By stressing the process-oriented research method I am moving away from the realist IR paradigm that holds on to ontological rationalism and epistemological positivism, and lean more toward the relatively uncharted realm of constructivist ontology and interpretive epistemology. While neo-classical realism recaptures the importance of ideational variables in foreign policymaking process, the approach remains subscribed to the realist notion of international politics that treats material capabilities and national interests as pre-defined and a priori constant. At most, neo-classical realism considers the ideational factor as an intermediate variable between relative material capabilities of a state and her actual foreign policy, but the approach keeps ideas separate from capabilities as two distinct entities from each other. I argue, however, that (1) the definition and utility of material capabilities are rarely absolute and monolithic, but almost always relational and malleable; (2) national interests and the means devised to protect/maximize those interests are not constant but are constantly re-examined and re-evaluated by different groups of foreign policymakers; and (3) ideas and capabilities inter-penetrate and co-constitute each other. Ideas function more than simply a lens through which selected material capabilities are “seen” or “recovered,” as if that lens and the found capabilities are two separate entities like neo-classical realists suggest. Instead, the way policy makers perceive and interpret international politics not only constructs the way they react to external challenges and opportunities, but also defines the range of appropriate policy instruments to solve the problem lying ahead. As much as capabilities condition ideas, ideas define capabilities. This argument may be extended to the abiding debate of the agent-structure relations both in IR and political science.
The constructivist-interpretive framework I just delineated leads me to raise analytic questions different from the rationalist IR scholarship. Besides a presentation of the inter-state power relations of East Asia during the 1920s, I further ask what these power relations meant to different groups of China’s foreign policymakers who held competing understandings of Sino-Western relations and interpreted certain foreign affairs issues through those competing understandings. As Samuel H. Beer cogently suggests, human behavior “always comes with meaning, with intentions and purposes. . . . [I]f the social scientists wants to describe the sequence of the interaction, he cannot omit what it means to the actors. He studies not just behavior but action.”[v] I plan to examine the interpretive actions of foreign policymakers who attempted to make sense of particular foreign affairs issues by referring to their prior understandings of international politics, and offered foreign policy proposals accordingly. This meaning-constructing endeavor by China’s foreign policymakers cannot be overestimated, because each set of prior understandings provides a frame, or a template, that “identifies a problem and offers a solution.”[vi] Confronting the same situation, foreign policymakers with different mental constructs would frame the problem, define the situation, and devise policy proposals differently by following their previous understandings of Sino-Western relations. Hence adopting frame analysis requires “an explanation of how categories of thought work together to shape perception and define a situation. It must be illustrated how cognitive categories operate to organize, shape, and classify raw experiential material, that is make it meaningful.”[vii]
So I conceive China’s foreign policymaking during the 1920s as a deliberative and interpretive process, in which contending groups of Chinese political participants with competing frames of perception and interpretation vied for their policy proposals’ legitimation and dominance by “seeking to generate agreement and support” with a broader audience, both domestic and international.[viii] This dynamic process eventually brought about an inter-subjective and temporarily stabilized policy decision, whose persuasiveness was constantly questioned and whose legitimacy was unceasingly re-examined by contending policymakers and their ideas. Therefore this stabilized policy decision was rarely final, and was under close scrutiny by contending groups of political actors who were constituted with competing frames and different definitions of situations. A change in the membership of China’s foreign policy decision-making body (that introduced new understandings of international politics), or the way international politics unfolded in particular issue-area (that challenged the constituting logic of the decision, or falsified the predictions it suggested) would either reinforce the legitimacy of that decision, or problematize its relevance and appropriateness to that issue-area. A foreign policy decision hence is a layered composition of ruptures, contradictions and continuities of policy frames.
This chapter begins with an examination of changing power relations of East Asia in the 1920s and China’s status in that regional order. It has been a consensus among historians of modern Chinese history that, until the early 1920s, the major powers still yet defined China as an equal member in the Westphalian international system. Throughout that decade China remained an inflammatory problem, and was not considered a respectable partner, in international politics.[ix] Internally divided and materially underdeveloped, the empire-turned Republic of China was still a long way from being taken seriously with her requests for full recognition and equal membership. Although China’s material power in absolute terms was indisputably negligible compared to the capabilities of major stakeholders in East Asian geopolitics, the same region, however, had witnessed a significant shift in the balance of power in the post-WWI era: a ascending but unsecured Japan, a weakened but staying Britain, a devastated France, a revolutionary Russia, and a powerful yet un-committed America. A flux in East Asian power relations rendered obsolete the pre-war arrangement of major powers on their China policy, a destabilizing development that unexpectedly elevated China’s relative bargaining power in her bilateral relations with respective major powers.[x] But old rules died hard; a rearranged East Asian order never meant that major powers voluntarily adjust their economic, legal and territorial privileges in China; nor did it precede an automatic withdrawal of major powers from their deep intervention in China’s administration in almost every modern sector.[xi]
Following the description of shifting East Asian order as a temporal-spacial context of international politics is an analysis of China’s foreign policy with respect to her campaigns for treaty revision. Notwithstanding her structural weakness and unfavorable environment, China since the mid-1920s was becoming more relentless in her requests to abolish the “unequal treaties” system, which was tantamount to a redefinition of Sino-Western relations even before the country was administratively unified and materially strengthened. This apparently revisionist foreign policy was preceded by a heightened frequency and increasing violence in Sino-Western confrontations in Chinese territory during in the mid-1920s. Apparently the radicalization of China’s foreign policy contradicts the structural realist proposition, which suggests that distribution of relative material capabilities in international relations determines the foreign policy of each state. Structural realism can not adequately account for a conspicuous disparity between China’s miniscule capabilities and her ambitious foreign policy.
But a depiction of China as a challenger of East Asian order constitutes only a half of what actually happened in the 1920s. Instead, what actually happened was that two approaches for the realization of treaty revision appeared simultaneously in China’s foreign policy, namely, revisionist demands and relentless bargaining on the one hand, and determined domestic reform and institution-building on the other. The two approaches complemented each other to squeeze out concessions from the weakened and uncoordinated imperial powers little by little. Furthermore, China’s domestic legal-political reform was devised not to discard or overthrow the existing international legal system; rather, this foreign policy-oriented domestic reform was meant to rectify the system by way of redressing issues that, in the eyes of the Chinese, had severely forestalled the constituting norms of the system, i.e., sovereign equality and territorial jurisdiction. In short, China as a weak member of international order acted as a system challenger and a system supporter almost simultaneously. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon cannot be adequately explained until the influence of ideational factors (and their interactions with material factors), both at system and unit levels, are given due attention. This realization leads to the third section of this chapter.
China’s ostensibly incoherent foreign policy, I suggest, was a layered composition of two competing interpretive frames of Sino-Western relations that prevailed in Chinese politics throughout the 1920s. Influenced by political ideals and ideologies from abroad (Western Europe, the U.S., Russia, and Japan), Chinese intellectuals, politicians and political activists constructed and rallied around these two contending sets of arguments in order to explain China’s structural failure since the last years of her imperial past, and also to propose corresponding prescriptions. Although the two sets of arguments began from the same nationalistic baseline—China’s sense of humiliation and frustration in her foreign affairs—they diverged along different pathways by providing competing accounts of the root cause of China’s constant failure and the prescriptions for that problem.[xii] The two contending frames of interpretations are conceptualized as two ideal-types of persuasion, lest I risk reifying the 1920s Chinese foreign policy.[xiii] That is, the policy stance and preference of almost every foreign affairs participant in the 1920s China was a mixture or approximation of the two interpretations, with one dominating interpretation over the other.
The first frame of interpretation, which I term the internationalist, attributed China’s perpetual decline mainly to ineffective domestic institutions and decadent state capabilities.[xiv] For the internationalist, China’s international humiliation meant her institutional weakness from within. Of those who approximated this frame, the prescription for China’s weakness was state-building through institutional modernization: creating a capable and powerful bureaucracy in the central government, and encouraging the expansion of a modern economy in coastal and metropolitan areas to garner sufficient taxation for the regime’s administrative reform and security apparatuses. In other words, the establishment of modern technocracy in the central government, bolstered by elitist professionalism in the modern-urban setting, became the core notion of the internationalist prescription for strengthening the country. Seeing through the internationalist prism, financial and technological aid from industrially advanced states were crucial elements for the prospect of China’s administrative reform, political centralization and military modernization. Therefore, this argument held, China should concentrate on strengthening her administrative, political, and security capabilities as her first and foremost task, because it was the lack of those core capabilities that invited all the humiliations and frustrations.
China, following this argument, should avoid confrontation with major powers, especially on intractable but less urgent issues, for example the continuous practice of extraterritoriality in the form of consular justice, because those foreign privileges could be dealt with much easier when the quality of China’s domestic governance improved to a significant degree.[xv] The benefits of imperialist presence in China outweighed its costs at this stage, because China could not strengthen herself without foreign assistance.[xvi] The internationalist suasion hence urged a modest and conciliatory foreign policy that sought national security and material progress through bargaining and cooperation with major powers.
Consequently internationalists held the view that China should work closely with major powers to first reform her domestic governance and then move on to improve her international status.[xvii] In short, China could revise the legal-political terms of Sino-Western relations only after she established domestic legal-political institutions compatible with those of Western counterparts. Apparently the international normative trend of the day appealed to those who favored the internationalist argument: the emphasis on the enlargement and perfection of administrative power found theoretical endorsement in the enduring preoccupation of public administration in contemporary German and American political science. Similarly, the calling of political centralization for the making of a strong state may be traced to the political theory of organic origin of the nation-state which was then dominant in Germany, the U.S., and especially Japan.
Particularly, the post-WWI Chinese society was well receptive to Wilson’s liberal notions of national self-determination and sovereign equality, not only because those liberal ideals hinted the potential malleability of the existing international legal-political system, but even more because Wilsonian theory pre-supposed the positive relationship between the quality of public administration (both national and international) and international peace.[xviii] This putative correlation between public administration and world peace justified the internationalist agenda of reforming China’s political and judicial institutions as the most important task of Chinese government, because her self-reforming efforts would contribute to peace and justice in international relations, and hence would receive due recognition from the international society, render obsolete and unnecessary the existing legal framework of Sino-Western relations, and have it either revised or altogether repealed. [xix] Western experts of law and public administration who were either architects or proponents of the modern “administrative science,” for example Frank Goodnow and William Willoughby, had participated in administrative modernization projects of the Beijing regime (1912-1928).[xx]
The other frame of interpretation, which I call the revolutionist, contended that state-building through merit-based technocracy and international cooperation was a path leading to China’s perpetual subordination, not eventual emancipation. The root cause of China’s humiliation, the revolutionist perspective insisted, was the worldwide imperialist expansion and the accompanying imperialist aggression against China’s sovereignty.[xxi] For the revolutionist, China’s international humiliation meant imperialist hegemony from without. What the revolutionist advocated as the solution for China’s weakness was nation-building through mass mobilization and grass-roots resistance: the revolutionist championed an immediate and—if necessary—unilateral termination of “unequal” Western privileges currently exercised in China. They also favored a makeover of the existing international legal-political order, which in their eyes had functioned to justify and sustain a hegemonic and oppressive relationship between major powers and China (hence the invented term “unequal treaties” in China circa 1924). Such an ambitious strategy, the revolutionist held, should begin from grassroots campaigns that mobilized disgruntled groups of intellectuals, laborers, soldiers and radical politicians, and inculcated them with a consciousness of China as an oppressed nation vis-à-vis Western powers as imperialist oppressors. Hence the revolutionist solution for China’s structural problem relied mainly on the “enlightened” masses, mostly in urban and modern sectors.
The revolutionist ridiculed the internationalist and the Beijing regime they supported as the agent of imperialist oppressors (so the propagation of derogatory terms such as the “warlord,” “the comprador class,” and the “piggy parliamentarian” in the 1920s) who perpetuated China’s inferior status.[xxii] Also, the internationalist efforts of state-building were relegated by the revolutionist as nothing more than erecting a legal-political infrastructure that legalized and reinforced imperialist domination and that benefited the agents of the major powers (mainly the militarists and bankers in the context of the 1920s China). They argued, therefore, that China should set the eradication of the “unequal treaties” system as the top priority of foreign policy agenda. Consequently the revolutionist advocated a foreign policy that was disturbing to the vested interests of the treaty powers in China, and the revolutionist demands for a radical revision or even immediate abrogation of the “unequal treaties” was tantamount to a seismic shift of the existing international order. Based upon popular support, the revolutionist foreign policy converted what had been a manifestation of Western material superiority, i.e., the modern sector of economy in China, into a powerful weapon of an anti-imperialist movement during the 1920s, a development that was inconceivable before the tide of radical ideals rolled in.[xxiii]
However, the unilateral action and unyielding attitude of the revolutionist faction almost always invited vehement resistance of major powers, hence beginning in the mid-1920s a series of violent and consequential conflicts between China’s nationalist movement and individual major powers (Britain, Japan, Russia and the U.S.) occurred. Although the revolutionist interpretation was antithetical to its internationalist contender, neither of the arguments was of a purely indigenous origin. Whereas liberal Wilsonism and conservative statism lent support to the internationalist faction, Marxism-Leninism and (to a lesser degree) anarchism enriched the intellectual contents and empowered revolutionism in China.
It has to point out that as ideal types standing on the two ends of a conceptual continuum, the two frames of interpretation of Sino-Western relations may be found co-existed and convoluted in Chinese foreign policy, whose configuration was conditioned by the context of East Asian power relations of the 1920s. It was not the case that the prevalence of one frame of interpretation completely replaced and eradicated the presence of the other frame from policymaking process; instead, during the decade Chinese foreign policy was situated somewhere along the continuum. It should be understood that I apply a frame analysis, in a genealogical sense, to investigate the historical process in which the two frames penetrated in Chinese foreign policy and contended for predominance, and generated policy change. A genealogy approach pre-supposes that a social phenomenon comes about less as a manifestation of some indispensable, innate and coherent essences of that phenomenon, but more as a presentation of constantly evolving configuration of discontinuities and contradictions. Hence a social phenomenon is by definition inconsistent and incoherent in its content and expression. In other words, a genealogy approach suggests that a social phenomenon is made by layers and juxtaposition of contending ideas and practices.[xxiv] Rather than seeking out a linear succession of competing foreign policy proposals in Chinese politics, I trace the process of discursive transformation through which the now taken-for-granted terms and arguments, for example the concepts of warlordism and the understanding of the unequal treaties, were invented, adopted, legitimized and mobilized by China’s political activists, and eventually became orthodoxy narratives in China’s foreign policymaking. This genealogy approach is adequate in analyzing the changing configuration of the 1920s Chinese foreign policy that, due to the contention of the two frames of interpretation, seems self-contradictory, wavering and incoherent.
Placing emphasis on the genealogy of interaction of the two contending frames of interpretation during the 1920s would help better explain the radicalization of China’s foreign policy. Internationalism as the predominant interpretation of Sino-Western relations came under severe challenges after the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference, because in the eyes of Chinese political activists (and potentially active ones) the internationalist explanations and prescriptions of China’s weakness floated farther and farther away from what they perceived as the embarrassing reality of China’s humiliating status in world politics. Given the frustration with China’s structural weakness and the infuriating disillusionment with the internationalist policy proposals, Chinese political activists since the early 1920s began to seek and devise alternative interpretations and prescriptions that would make sense of China’s frustration in her foreign affairs. While the revolutionist interpretation was well received and gaining the upper hand among Chinese political activists at the grassroots level, the internationalist frame did not phase out from Chinese official declarations (although the interpretation indeed suffered a blow of legitimacy crisis) but went through a metamorphotic ordeal (that took off the liberal constitutionalist trait and put on an authoritarian statist attribute), and later regained prestige in the foreign policy of the Nationalist regime based at Nanjing (1928-1937).
In the meantime, East Asian power relations were changing, with a war-devastated Britain retreating and a victorious but insecure Japan marching in to assure and expand her interests in mainland Asia. This simultaneous flux of ideational and material structures co-developed into the treaty revision movement in the 1920s, which was executed by successive Chinese regimes (the Beijing, Canton, Wuhan, and eventually the Nanjing governments), and by the early 1930s had made uneven achievements in reclaiming tariff autonomy, recovering several territorial concessions, and abolishing extraterritorial justice.
In summary, let us be reminded again of the analytic question at the outset of this chapter: is it possible for a state to simultaneously challenge and support the existing international legal-political order? My tentative answer is a conditioned yes because the case of the 1920s Chinese foreign policy clearly presents an example.
[i] Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” World Politics 51(1): pp. 144-172.
[ii] The loosely defined label of neo-classical realism recaptures the importance of meaning, ideas, intentions and perceptions in foreign policymaking process while retains the fundamental notions of realism. To understand the appearance and agenda of the approach, read Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” World Politics 51(1): pp. 144-172; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, “Negotiating International History and Politics” in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 1-36; Randall L. Schweller, “The Twenty Year’ Crisis, 1919-39: Why a Concert Didn’t Arise”, in Bridges and Boundaries, pp. 181-212; Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 311-348; John A. Vasquez, “Kuhn or Lakatos? The Case for Multiple Frames in Appraising IR Theory” in Progress in International Relations Theory, pp. 419-454; and Jeffrey Taliaferro, “Neoclassicla Realism: The Psychology of Great Power Intervention” in Making Sense of International Relations Theory, edited by Jennifer Sterling-Folker (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 38-53. Three recent articles that exemplify the empirical neo-classical realist approach are: S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wolfforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold WAR: Reevaluating the Landmark Case for Ideas”, International Security 25(3): 5-53; Jason W. Davidson, “The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39”, Security Studies 11(4): pp. 125-159; and David M. Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers”, Security Studies 12(1): 1-40.
[iii] Helle Malmvig, State Sovereignty and Intervention: A Discourse Analysis of Interventionary and Non-Interventionary Practices in Kosovo and Algeria (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 30.
[iv] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Making Sense of Making Sense: Configurational Analysis and the Double Hermeneutic”, in Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn, edited by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 267.
[v] Samuel H. Beer, “Letter to a Graduate Student”, in Perestroika! The Raucous Rebellion in Political Science, edited by Kristen Renwick Monroe (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 58.
[vi] Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 53.
[vii] Pamela Brandwein, “Studying the Careers of Knowledge Claims”, in and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn, pp. 232.
[viii] Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, 53.
[ix] Edmund S.K. Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain’s South China Policy, 1924-1931, ch. 2.
[x] Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System 1918-1920, 100-101.
[xi] Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System 1918-1920, 102.
[xii] Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 209.
[xiii] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Making Sense of Making Sense: Configurational Analysis and the Double Hermeneutic”, 267-9.
[xiv] Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 246.
[xv] Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 248-9.
[xvi] Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 211-2.
[xvii] Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 211.
[xviii] Ido Oren, Our Enemies and US: America’s Rivalries and the Making of Political Science (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 34-8.
[xix] Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System 1918-1920, ch. 2. Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 249-250.
[xx] Ernst P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China, pp. 171-5; Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 220.
[xxi] Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 230.
[xxii] Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 243.
[xxiii] Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, translated by Janet Lloyd, 254-8.
[xxiv] James Der Derian, On Diplomacy (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 76, 79-80.